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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DON FOSTER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
ELMO J. STEED, an individual, 
GORDON G. WHEELER, an individual, 
ELMO J. STEED and GORDON G. No. 
WHEELER dba S & W TEXACO SERVICE, 10685 
a partnership, and TEXACO, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendants, 
TEXACO, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant, Texaco Inc. (Texaco) files this reply to 
demonstrate that the undisputed facts relied upon by Re-
spondent in his brief clearly support Texaco's position that 
Steed and Wheeler, d/b/a S & W Texaco Service, are inde-
pendent contractors. In addition, Texaco will show that the 
cases cited in the Respondent's brief are inapplicable to the 
factual situation of this case and do not support his con-
tentions. 
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POINT I 
BASED ON THE UNDISPUTED FACTS RECITED 
BY RESPONDENT, THE APPELLANT, TEXACO IS 
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Although Respondent sets for the the facts "in a light 
most favorable to the trial court's judgment" (Brief, page 
3), in any light the undisputed facts clearly show that Steed 
and Wheeler are independent contractors in the operation 
and conduct of their business the S & W Texaco Service. 
Respondent's brief demonstrates that Texaco neither exer-
cised direct nor indirect control of the day-by-day business 
and operation of S & W Texaco Service.1 Respondent's brief, 
does not point out a single instance where Texaco required 
Steed and Wheeler to operate S & W Texaco Service in any 
particular manner. To the contrary, Respondent's factual 
statement carefully uses the term "encourage" when de-
scribing the approach of Texaco's representatives to Steed 
and Wheeler. Respondent further states that Texaco's em-
ployees " 'tried to sell' the operator on meeting Texaco's 
standards ... " (Brief, page 7) Indeed, if Steed and Wheeler 
are Texaco's agents in the operation of S & W Texaco Serv-
ice, Texaco did not have to "try to sell" its standards. In-
stead of showing control of the business operation, Re-
spondent's factual statement shows that Steed and Wheeler 
lRespondent asserts at page 7 of his brief that "Wheeler and 
Steed could not sell products purchased from others under Texaco's 
trademark, nor mixed or co-mingled products [and that] the only 
pumps and si~ns at. the stat~on w~re marke~ Texaco.". '.£'he~e ~nex­
plained assertions might be m1sleadmg. There is no prov1s1on m. e:t~er 
the lease or the agreement of sale with Wheeler (R. 51-52) proh1b1tmg 
or limiting the lessee's right to sell products from other manufacturers, 
refiners or third parties in any manner. In fact, the r~cord shc;>ws that 
Steed and Wheeler sold products manufactured by third parties. 
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are fully independent in the conduct and operation of their 
partnership business. 
Significantly, Respondent does not advance any facts 
showing that the relationship between Texaco and Steed and 
Wheeler is not controlled by the lease and agreement of sale. 
It is undisputed that the entire relationship between Texaco 
and Steed and Wheeler at the time of the accident was gov-
erned by a lease and agreement of sale with Wheeler dated 
May 28, 1962 and June, 1, 1962, respectively. (R.51-52) 2 
Under the lease, Texaco leased the premises "together 
with buildings, improvements, fixtures, equipment and 
facilities owned or leased by lessor" for a definite term at a 
stipulated rental. The agreement of sale merely provides the 
maximum amount of products Texaco is required to deliver 
in a year, the points of delivery, applicable discounts and 
the terms of payment. Neither the lease nor the agreement 
of sale specify the method, manner or details of the opera-
tion and the management of the leased premises. Under both 
contracts, the lessee has the exclusive responsibility for op-
eration and management. The contracts do not contain any 
provision setting the resale prices of the products purchased 
by the lessee, nor do they specify an amount of product 
which must be sold. Title to all products sold and purchased 
under the sales agreement passes directly to the purchaser 
and the sales agreement does not contain any limitation on 
the resale terms. Neither contract requires any particular 
hours of operation of the leased premises and the contracts 
2Respondent concedes "All documents evidencing the rel:;-tions~ip 
of the parties were prepared by Texaco on standard forms. (Brief, 
p. 14) [Emphasis added] 
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do not prohibit the sale of products manufactured or dis-
tributed by other suppliers. They contain no provisions for 
the inspection of the business records of the lessee, nor is 
there any requirement that the lessee devote his full time to 
the operation of the station and accept no outside work. In 
addition, there is no requirement that the lessee wear any 
particular uniform and the lessee is not required to make 
reports of any nature concerning his business activities. 
On their face, these instruments establish a landlord-
tenant relationship. There are no other agreements or un-
derstandings, expressed or implied, between the parties. 
There is no evidence that these contracts as written do not 
establish the relationship of the parties or that the parties 
abandoned the contracts and Texaco took control of the 
station. 
Wheeler has possession and control of the leased prem-
ises only under the May 28th lease. Significantly, the 
partnership operated the leased premises independently and 
have not only sold products manufactured by others, but 
have also conducted substantial other business activities on 
the premises without interference in any manner from 
Texaco. 
In the operation and management of the leased service 
station, Wheeler purchased gasoline and other products 
from Texaco on a cash basis and is responsible for the stor-
age and taxes on the products purchased. The partnership 
bears all of the operating costs of the business, including 
taxes, franchise and license fees, heat, light, telephone and 
water. Steed and Wheeler are free to sell their products for 
cash or credit at their own discretion and they are free to 
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set their own terms, including the extension of credit to 
customers of their choice. They retain all the profits and 
bear all of the risk of loss in their business. 
Of course, there is no presumption of agency. After the 
extensive depositions in this case, Respondent has not shown 
that the relationship between Texaco and Steed and Wheeler 
is other than landlord-tenant. It is well settled that a land-
lord is not an insurer against the negligence of his tenant 
and that tenancy alone does not render the landlord liable 
for the tortious acts of his tenant. Tryba v. Petcoff, 10 Wis. 
2d 308, 103 N.W.2d 14 (1960); Sherman v. Texas Co., 340 
Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 916 (1960); Coe v. Esau, 377 P.2d 
815 (Okla. 1963); Brittain v. Atlantic Refining Co., 126 
N.J.L. 528, 19 A.2d 793 (1941); Texas Co. v. Wheat, 140 
Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943); Texas Co. v. Grant, 143 
Tex. 145, 182 S.W.2d 996 (1944) ; Reynolds v. Skelly Oil Co., 
227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823 (1939). Hence, Texaco is not 
liable for the torts of its lessee. 
Essentially, Respondent contends that a fact question 
arises because ( 1) Texaco's lease required Wheeler to keep the 
leased premises "in a clean, safe and healthful condition" and 
Texaco inspected the premises; (2) a large Texaco sign was 
displayed on the premises; (3) Texaco made certain repairs 
to the leased premises; and ( 4) Texaco could summarily 
terminate Wheeler. Additionally, Respondent contends that 
"Texaco encouraged the operator to identify with its prod-
uct" and received marketing assistance. (Brief, page 14) 3 
BRespondent also points out that there were no articles <?f partn~r­
ship between Steed and Wheeler and 3:ls<? ~hat they had !ailed to file 
a statement of doing business under a flctit10us name. (B_rief, page 14) 
If these facts have significance, they show that Texaco_ did n<?t concern 
itself with the operation and conduct of the partnership busmss. 
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(1) An obligation to maintain the premises does not create 
an agency 
Certainly, a lessor can require the lessee to maintain the 
leased premises in a specified condition without making the 
lessee his agent. Such a standard lease provision is prudent 
to protect the lessor's interest in the leased promises. More-
over, Texaco's periodic inspections and suggestions on 
cleanliness are consistent with Wheeler's obligations under 
the lease. As held in Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 215 N.C. 422, 
2 S.E.2d 26 (1939), Texaco is within its right as a landlord 
in making these inspections and giving suggestions. 
(2) A sign advertising Texaco's brand products does not 
establish that Texaco runs the station 
Although S & W Texaco Service exhibited signs and 
insignia bearing the Texaco registered trademarks and 
trade names, such displays do not alter the landlord-tenant 
relationship. It is well known that such signs and insignia 
are displayed throughout the country by independent dealers 
who sell Texaco branded products. Similarly, signs and in-
signia are also displayed by independent dealers selling 
petroleum products of other marketers. It is clear that these 
signs and emblems merely provide notice to the motoring 
public that a particular brand of petroleum products is 
available for sale at the service station. Reynolds v. Skelly 
Oil Co., 227 Iowa 163, 287 N.W. 823, 827 (1939); Coe v. 
Esau, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963); Sherman v. Texas Co., 
340 Mass. 606, 165 N.E.2d 916 (1960). 
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As held by the court in the Sherman case (165 N.E.2d, 
p.917): 
"There was testimony that the defendant has a 
distinguishing color and sign scheme for gasoline sta-
tions either owned or operated so that identification on 
all such stations is standard. This station had a 'char-
acteristic * * * banjo pole' displaying a round disc with 
the standard Texaco identification, 'a red star with 
green and the letters "Texaco." ' The gasoline pumps 
were of a standard type and color scheme, which is 
used for both owned and leased stations. The station 
had the name Texaco on its signs and the characteristic 
colors, white with green trim, on the building. On sta-
tions 'operated solely by * * * [the defendant]' there is 
a sign over the door in six inch block letters reading 
'The Texas Company.' There was no such sign over the 
door of this station or elsewhere on the premises. The 
lease of a fully equipped station, including three pumJ)6 
and a 'banjo pole and sign,' corroborated the inference 
from the open display of Texaco identification that this 
display was with the defendant's approval and pursuant 
to its design. 
"We rule that the representation of the signs was 
confined to the statement that Texaco gasoline was sold 
at the station. We agree with the statement in Reynolds 
v. Skelly Oil Co., 277 Iowa 163, 171, 287 N.W. 823, 827, 
that it 'is a matter of common knowledge that these 
trademark signs are displayed * * * by independent 
dealers' [Citation omitted]" 
( 3) Minor repairs by Texaco to the premises are con-
sistent with its interest as a landlord 
Of course, a landlord is authorized to make minor re-
pairs to the premises with the consent of the tenant. Again, 
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by making such repairs, the landlord merely protects his 
interest in the leasehold. 
(4) Texaco cannot summarily terminate its lessee under 
the May 28 lease 
Respondent's assertion that Texaco can summarily 
terminate Wheeler is contrary to the May 28 lease. Under 
the lease, the service station was leased for a one-year 
period and the rights and obligations of the lessor and 
lessee are defined. Either party can terminate the lease "at 
the end of the first year or subsequent year on ten (10) 
days' prior written notice." The lease also provides that the 
lessor can terminate the lease if the lessee breaches its 
covenants or upon certain specified conditions. Such a 
termination clause is a standard provision in leases and is 
designed to protect the landlord's interest in the property. 
Certainly, Texaco cannot summarily terminate Wheeler 
under this provision, as Respondent asserts. 
POINT II 
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT 
DO NOT SUPPORT HIS POSITION 
The first case cited by the Respondent, Gonzales v. Der-
rington, 10 Cal.Rpts. 700 (1961), was reversed on appeal by 
the Supreme Court of California, 363 P.2d 1, 14 Cal.Rpts. 1 
(1961). In this case three drunks who had been thrown out 
of a caf e secured 4112 gallons of gas in an open bucket from 
a Union Oil station. They took the gas and threw it onto the 
floor of the cafe and ignited it. Three persons were burned 
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to death and one other was seriously injured. The Court of 
Appeals in the case cited by the Respondent held that the 
service station attendant, by delivering gasoline in an open 
container in violation of a state statute, was negligent and 
that his negligence was a proximate cause of the deaths and 
injury. Union Oil was held responsible on the narrow ground 
that since it had retained title to gasoline it had retained 
control of the method of delivery. The Supreme Court of 
California reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that the 
deaths and injury were the result of an independent inter-
vening cause and that defendant Union Oil Company's 
motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. 
Two of the cases cited by the Respondent in his brief 
involve injuries which were sustained as the result of cer-
tain defects in premises owned by the defendant oil com-
pany. Accordingly, an action against the defendant oil com-
pany as owner of the premises was allowed. 
The first case in this category is Boronskis v. The Texas 
Company, 183 N.E.2d 127 (Mass., 1962), in which the 
plaintiff's property was damaged as a result of a leaking 
gasoline storage tank. The storage tank was a permanent 
fixture and part of the premises owned by the defendant oil 
company. The defendant oil company had always authorized 
inspection of the storage tanks and had paid for all repairs 
to the storage tanks. The second case is Edwards v. Gulf Oil 
Co., 69 Ga.App. 140, 24 S.E.2d 843 (1943), which involved 
the death of a child caused by a large depression in the side-
walk adjacent to the service station which had been filled 
with hot oil or tar. 
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In the cases of Ryan v. Standard Oil Co., 144 S.W.2d 
170, (Mo. App., 1940), and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hoop-
er, 164 .2d 743 (CA 5th, 1947), also cited by the Respondent, 
the issue of whether or not the oil company controlled the 
operation of the dealer was not even discussed. In the Ryan 
case, the defendant in its answer had admitted that it con-
trolled the operation of the dealer. The court on page 174 
stated: 
"The corporate defendant in its answer aff irma-
tively alleged that it solely and exclusively owned and 
operated, maintained and controlled the filling station, 
and that the same was not in any manner owned, op-
erated or maintained or controlled by defendant Basye." 
In the Phillips case, although the court found that there 
was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of 
the defendant's control and ownership of the station, there 
was absolutely no discussion in the opinion as to what the 
facts were on which the relationship between the oil com-
pany and dealer was based. 
In Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry, 241 Ala. 42, 1 So.2d 29, 
(1941), the court, in holding the defendant oil company 
liable to the plaintiff, based its decision on the theory of 
estoppel. The defendant, Standard Oil Company, for a long 
time prior to the accident had operated the service station. 
During this time the plaintiff had been a regular customer 
of the station. Six weeks prior to the accident Standard Oil 
leased the station to a lessee. The evidence indicated that 
there was no difference in the method or manner of opera-
tion of the service station after the station was leased in 
comparison to its prior operation. The court held that 
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plaintiff had a right to rely upon the fact that the apparent 
operation of the service station was still by the defendant 
oil company. 
The remaining two cases which the Respondent cites in 
support of his position are clearly distinguishable upon their 
facts. In Brenner v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 236 Mo.App. 
524, 158 S.W.2d 171 (1942), the facts clearly indicated that 
the defendant oil company, through its agent, had given 
orders and instructions concerning the detail of the day to 
day operations of the station. Also, the dealer regularly re-
ported to the defendant concerning lubrication and washing 
income, the sale of tires, tubes and specialty items. 
In Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 
175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949), the dealer Snyder was required 
to make reports to the Humble Oil Company and to "per-
form other duties in connection with the operation of the 
station that might be required of him from time to time by 
the company." Furthermore, the defendant, Humble Oil 
Company, paid 75 percent of the utility bill, which was one 
of the most important operating expenses of the dealer. The 
Supereme Court of Texas clearly distinguishes the facts in 
the Humble Oil case from the prior case of The Texas Com-
pany v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 168 S.W.2d 632 (1943). In The 
Texas Company case the Supreme Court of Texas held that 
the dealer was not the employee or agent of the defendant 
oil company. The Texas Company case on its facts is very 
similar to the present case. The dealer paid cash for the 
merchandise purchased from the oil company, bore all of 
the expenses of operating the station, employed and con-
trolled the employees, and stood the losses and appropriated 
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the profits from the operation of the station. The oil com-
pany, as a condition precedent to the leasing of the station, 
had the right to maintain certain standards of cleanliness in 
operating the station and held certain schools for the dealers 
with respect to the operation of the service station. In-
structions were also given from time to time by company 
representatives on how to service cars. The Supreme Court 
of Texas sustained a directed verdict in favor of the de-
f endant, The Texas Company. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Texaco, Inc., submits that 
the undisputed facts compel entry of summary judgment in 
its favor. The undisputed facts conclusively show that 
Texaco did not control or direct the operation of S & W 
Texaco Service. Consequently, Texaco is not liable for any 
alleged negligence of its lessee or its employees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant, Texaco, Inc. 
